In this article I apply a framework for thinking about the relationship between international trade and interstate conflict onset and escalation which incorporates distinct roles for trade volume and trade interdependence. I focus on the implications of such an approach for understanding trade-conflict dynamics in the broad Asia and Pacific region. The region, especially East Asia, is interesting to study from this perspective for at least two reasons.
First, the amount of intra-regional trade has expanded greatly since about 1980 (Wu, 2007;  Asian Development Bank, 2009) , roughly coinciding with the changes introduced by Deng Xiaoping to Chinese domestic and international economic relations beginning in 1979. This corresponds with a regional drop in interstate war and deadly conflict in the region (Tønnesson, 2009) . Second, Asian states, especially those in Northeast and Southeast Asia, are often considered to have a distinctive trade-based recipe for development, based on export-led growth with a large role for the strategic choices of the state, usually called the 'developmental state' model (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989) . I do find some difference in the trade-conflict dynamics in East Asia, and one motivation for this study is to identify a variable which explains this difference and may be substituted for the proper name 'East Asia' (Przeworski and Teune, 1970: 8) . The developmental state model appears to be such a variable.
In the rest of the article, I first briefly discuss the concepts of interdependence and volume as aspects of trade which might be considered distinct in their relationship with international conflict. I pay special attention to how the developmental state model might interact with these two aspects of trade. I next discuss measures and methods, and then present results for a series of probit selection models which examine my propositions. I summarize conclusions in the final section of the article.
Interdependence
As both a signaling tool and a representation of state-level opportunity costs, trade interdependence has qualities that might reduce the likelihood of conflict onset. This is so because putting trade at risk implies that leaders have the resolve to suffer the domestic costs incurred if that trade is actually lost in conflict with the trading partner. The likelihood of significant domestic political costs makes the trade-based signal credible (Fearon, 1995 (Fearon, & 1997 . Regarding conflict onset, Crescenzi (2003) considers how contentious interchanges over trade before a militarized crisis might be consistent with a negative (pacific) effect of interdependence on the subsequent emergence of a militarized dispute, because they facilitate communication about resolve.
3 As Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (2001: 400) put it, 'interdependence makes it easier to substitute nonviolent contests for militarized disputes in signalling resolve.'
At the stage of escalation to serious violent conflict, bargaining theories may point to the further ability of interdependent states to credibly signal their resolve during a crisis through placing trade at risk (Morrow, 1999: 487) . However, I argue that this does not fully consider the selection dynamics of the conflict onset stage (see also Goldsmith, 2013) . Tradebased economic interdependence for the state and its adversary are likely to be observable at the conflict onset stage, and thus fully considered by each state. Interdependence should not play a major role in the escalation stage because the potential costs to oneself and the adversary of risking that trade have already been 'priced in' to the calculations of each side.
The signals have already been sent. These arguments lead to two hypotheses.
But the absolute volume of trade could also be relevant for bargaining to avert escalation to violent conflict. As suggested, it might often be the case that the degree of the state's overall interdependence was factored into the decision when the state selected itself into the conflict onset stage (either by initiating the conflict, or by not conceding the issue at stake before the disagreement became militarized). In such circumstances, interdependence
would not play a significant role in further decisions about escalation. (Jervis, 1976) . Such tools should be more available when the overall amount of trade is high, and scarce if the overall amount of trade is low.
5 5 This argument might be usefully expanded to consider specific types of goods (Dorussen, 8 General hypotheses regarding trade volume:
Hypothesis 3. Higher dyadic trade volume will have a positive effect on the onset of interstate conflict.
Hypothesis 4: Higher dyadic trade volume will have a negative effect on the chance of interstate conflict escalation to more serious violence.
East Asian States and Trade Signalling
My expectations regarding East Asia are based on the centrality of trade, especially exports, to the developmental state model, and on the close connections between political and economic elites in states adopting the model. The model's core tenets originate with Johnson (1982) and are summarized well by Leftwich (1995) , Önis (1991), and Woo-Cummings (1999) . Leftwich (1995: 405) lists the 'six major components' of the concept: '(i) a determined developmental elite; (ii) relative [state] autonomy; (iii) a powerful, competent, and insulated economic bureaucracy; (iv) a weak and subordinated civil society; (v) the effective management of non-state economic interests; (vi) and repression, legitimacy and performance.'
I argue that such a political-economic system would lead to the expectation that, other things equal, trade will be less potent as a signalling device for East Asian developmental states. Signalling logic depends on the existence of domestic constituencies able to impose costs on foreign policy decision makers. However, East Asian developmental states have constituencies with weaker abilities to impose costs. Civil society is especially weak, and business elites are not truly autonomous from the political and bureaucratic decision makers;
rather there are 'extraordinary degrees of elite unity' (Önis, 1991: 115) , while the state is relatively autonomous from sub-national pressure.
In such circumstances, signalling based on risking the loss of trade for the state would be seen by adversary states as incurring relatively fewer domestic costs, and more likely to be a bargaining tactic. Business elites will probably go along with, and may be complicit in, the overall conflict strategy if trade has come into the bargaining process. This will tend to reduce the pacific effect on conflict onset of overall economic interdependence, because the lower-cost signals sent will seem less credible. Hypotheses finding support in analysis with both types of dyad will deserve greater confidence.
East-Asia / Developmental-State Hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5: For East Asian dyads (Developmental States), higher dyadic trade interdependence will have a pacific effect on interstate conflict onset, but of less magnitude than for other types of dyads.
Hypothesis 6: For East Asian dyads (Developmental States), higher dyadic trade interdependence will have no effect on interstate conflict escalation to more serious violence.
[the same as Hypothesis 2]
Hypothesis 7. For East Asian dyads (Developmental States), higher dyadic trade volume will have a positive effect on the onset of interstate conflict, but of greater magnitude than for other types of dyads.
Hypothesis 8: For East Asian dyads (Developmental States), higher dyadic trade volume will have a pacific effect on the chance of interstate conflict escalation to more serious violence, but of less magnitude than for other types of dyads.
Measures and Methods
In this section I discuss measures and statistical methods used to test the hypotheses. Pooled dyadic annual time-series data are used (notation omits time indicators for clarity). Some variables are further described in the appendix.
Measures of Trade and Conflict
GDP share is the proportion of country i's gross domestic product that is represented by trade with a particular country j.
Once this is calculated, for each dyad ij, the lower of the two values of GDPshare is chosen, using the weak-link logic (Dixon, 1994) that the least dependent state (largest GDP) represents the effective level of interdependence (GDPshare Lowerij ).
The volume of trade is simply the sum of imports and exports within a dyad for a given year, in constant inflation-adjusted dollars.
It is important to note that there is not a high degree of empirical correlation between trade volume and interdependence (r = .293 for Tradevolume (ln) and GDPshare Lower ).
7 This is so because weak-link interdependence is proportional and hinges on the size of the larger state in the dyad, while trade volume is a function of both economies in the dyad, and not proportional.
My operationalization of international conflict involves measuring both the onset of a militarized dispute, and the escalation of some disputes to levels of serious interstate violence. Regime type and geographic distance are also important controls. In the conflict onset stage I use two indicators of dyadic regime type, measuring the degree of joint democracy in the dyad and the existence of a jointly authoritarian dyad as separate factors (Goldsmith, Chalup, and Quinlan, 2008) . I include Distance (natural log of miles between capitals), and Contiguity. 11 I also include a cubic polynomial for Peaceyears (number of years since the dyad's last MID) to account for temporal dependence (Carter and Signorino, 2010 (1979-) . Sources are noted in the appendix. 13 I now turn to a discussion of the choice of econometric method for assessing support for my hypotheses.
Econometric Models
The analysis relies on a Heckman (1976) selection estimator for probit models because the conflict escalation process might be vulnerable to selection bias. This occurs when there is a relationship between the factors causing a case to enter a sample, and the factors associated with the outcome to be studied.
A key insight of bargaining models of war is that international conflict analysis can suffer from selection bias. For example, both resolve and military capabilities are important for conflict onset as well as escalation. As Fearon (2002: 6-7) writes, 'Rational challengers select themselves into crises according to their prior beliefs about the defender's willingness to resist with force. To the extent that this occurs, the crises in which defenders' immediate deterrent threats are most credible will tend to be crises in which the challenging states are relatively strongly motivated to change the status quo, and thus willing to accept an appreciable risk of conflict. Hence despite their credibility compared to immediate deterrent threats in other cases, defender threats in this subset are less likely to succeed.' Other studies using selection models to examine escalation using MID data include Bennett and Stam (2004: 30, 117, 219) and Braithwaite and Lemke (2012) . Huth and Allee (2002: 35-36 ) raise another relevant issue. In dyadic time-series studies of international conflict, the possibility for theoretically irrelevant but statistically significant findings exists due to the rarity of conflict, and lack of much basis for conflict within many dyads. However, to assess the effects of international trade, it is preferable to include all dyads, since even smaller non-contiguous states often trade with each other.
Including relevant control variables is one approach suggested by Huth and Allee, and these are included in the models. The regional approach of this article further helps focus analysis on proximate, relevant dyads. A selection model also provides a check: in the second stage of the process, states which have selected themselves into militarized conflict represent a small and relevant subset, and the possibility of escalation is logically strong.
In the analyses that follow, I first present models including all intra-regional data, and using interaction terms for Asia-and-Pacific (excluding East Asia) dyads, East-Asian dyads, and dyads containing at least one developmental state, to assess whether there is a difference in the trade-conflict relationship between these groups and all other intraregional dyads in the world. I then proceed to models including only dyads for each group. I also discuss a number of robustness checks. Finally, I present estimates of the substantive impact of trade volume and interdependence on the chance of conflict onset and escalation in East Asia and among dyads with a developmental state, compared with all other intraregional dyads.
Results
I include all intraregional dyads in the models in Table 1 These patterns and conclusions are further supported by models 5 through 8 in Table   2 . While interaction terms in probit models are useful for assessing whether there is a statistical difference between one set of observations and another, their interpretation is not straightforward (Kam and Franzese, 2007) . I therefore present models using only the sets of dyads of interest in Table 2 , as well as two sets of marginal effect plots in Figures 1 and 2 .
Regarding the choice of selection models, the rho statistics in Models 1 through 5 are highly significant, indicating a strong likelihood of selection bias. However, the results are substantively unchanged if separate probit models are used. 
When all intraregional dyads excluding East Asia

Robustness checks
The dyads involved in deadly MIDs ( Recent literature on trade and conflict has suggested that trade conducted with fewer tariff or non-tariff barriers is most conducive to peace, while non-free trade is less so (McDonald, 2004) . Because developmental states tend to manage trade strategically, this argument might explain the findings. Another argument focuses on the role of RIAs in facilitating conflict avoidance or resolution (Haftel, 2007 In order to assess each of these hypotheses, I ran models similar to models 3 and 4 in states can be considered robust to these factors.
The findings in Table 2 prove highly robust in these sensitivity tests. In all cases, the trade variables and their interactions with East Asian and developmental state dyads retained comparable sign and significance, while in some instances the new dummy and interaction terms also produced significant results (not discussed, to save space).
Estimating Substantive Effects
The results discussed so far indicate that the effects of trade interdependence on the onset of interstate conflict in East Asia and among dyads with a developmental state appear to be smaller than in other intraregional dyads, as anticipated by hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 6 has also been supported because there is no indication of a difference between the null effects of interdependence on escalation in general and among East Asian or developmental state dyads.
However, hypotheses 7 and 8 have not found support.
interacting RIAs with trade volume is a reasonable substitute for economic scope. This has considerably greater substantive effect on conflict than leader meetings (Haftel, 2004: 230) .
In order to further assess hypotheses 5 through 8, a clearer indication of the relative substantive effects on the likelihood of interstate conflict onset and escalation is given in 16 Specifically, they are based on simulations using 10,000 sample draws from the multivariate normal distribution, similar to simulations produced by Clarify software (King, Tomz, and Wittenburg, 2000) or suggested by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2010) . For the simulations, separate probit models are used for each stage for the sake of computational simplicity, with the second stage run on data only for dyads with MID onsets (a conditional model). The probit results are very similar to those for models 5 and 6. scenarios for typical dyads at some plausible risk of conflict, rather than the average intraregional dyad, which has a very low a priori risk of conflict.
Figures 1 and 2 about here.
Comparison of these marginal effects strongly supports the conclusions already Note: Probit selection models. Dependent variable measured at year t +1 , independent variables at year t ; Statistically significant coefficients at .10 level or better indicated with bold font; Significance of rho based on the Likelihood Ratio test for independence of equations. All significance tests are two-tailed. 
